10 Years of Multilateral Religious Freedom Work

Ten years ago, on June 15, 2015, something remarkable happened. For arguably the first time ever, a group of countries decided to work collectively to advance religious freedom for people of different faiths outside their own borders. Throughout history, confessional states have fought for their own. However, in 2015, a new page was turned focused on religious freedom for all. Now, a decade into this experiment, we should reflect on the remarkable progress and the many challenges remaining.

Canadian Initiative, American Partnership

In 2015, with the ISIS depravations against religious minorities coming to light, we saw a need for like-minded nations to band together in defense of the shared value of religious freedom. Canada’s then Ambassador for Religious Freedom, Andrew Bennett, was a key actor, bringing energy and political support. He welcomed partnerships with myself (then at USCIRF) and others. After a series of initial discussions, the effort formally launched on June 15 in Brussels, with Andrew chairing the founding meeting of the International Contact Group on Freedom of Religion or Belief. Many attended, including myself. The city’s international profile hosting the European Union and NATO made it a worthy setting. The Obama administration’s religious freedom ambassador, David Saperstein, joined, as did representatives from key countries like the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, all of whom would play future leadership roles.

The International Contact Group, or ICG, served as an incubator for developing and implementing multilateral diplomacy on freedom of religion or belief (FoRB). While diplomats had collaborated around human rights in general, never before had efforts focused solely on freedom of religion or belief. Unfortunately, Andrew did not have much time to lead the effort. In November of that same year, he stepped down after Justin Trudeau’s election as Prime Minister. But the nascent endeavor continued. Andrew passed the baton, inviting me to serve as ICG co-chair (since I had joined the State Department) with Canadian diplomat Giuliana Natale.

The ICG became a place to share information between subject matter experts and diplomats, meeting twice a year, once in Geneva and once in New York. As I highlight in my book, we experimented with different forms of collective action. For instance, in 2017, we coordinated statements on social media denouncing the house arrest of the Eritrean Orthodox Patriarch and urging his release. While never freed, the government did allow him to attend a mass for the first time in years after the statements. It was a blessing to the Patriarch and a good return on low-cost diplomatic investment.

Larger efforts concerned freeing Asia Bibi in 2018. The Pakistani government refused to let her leave despite being acquitted of blasphemy allegations and released from prison. Through the ICG, we coordinated joint demarches on Islamabad, urging that she be allowed to join her family abroad. With multiple countries all delivering the same message in the same week, the show of force helped convince the military leadership to let her go. We saw how multilateral FoRB advocacy could work in meaningful ways, realizing the benefits of joint action and encouraging more governments to get involved.

When the Trump administration launched a series of ministerial-level meetings in 2018 and 2019, interest grew in elevating multilateral diplomacy to a higher political level. Under the leadership of Sam Brownback, the first Trump administration’s religious freedom ambassador, and a former senator and governor, he wanted something that could punch harder with a higher commitment among actual members. (The ICG was and remains a network.) The International Religious Freedom Alliance was launched in February 2020 with high aspirations. As its Declaration of Principles stated, “The Alliance is predicated on the idea more must be done to protect members of religious minority groups and combat discrimination and persecution based on religion or belief.”

Challenges in a Fraught World

As someone involved in designing the Alliance while co-chairing the ICG, we imported many of the ICG’s proven approaches into the Alliance. Its founding documents highlight a shared commitment to international standards and advocacy cooperation. It stated that the “Alliance intends to advocate for freedom of religion or belief for all” as defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and that its members are “willing to publicly and privately object to abuses.” Over the past five years, the Alliance has grown from 27 founding members to over 40, while its name changed to the International Religious Freedom or Belief Alliance (IRFBA) and now the Article 18 Alliance. All the while, the ICG continues to meet.

Now, 10 years after the ICG’s founding and five years after the Alliance’s launch, we must ask where to go from here.

The unprecedented level of attention on FoRB is worthy, as repression and discrimination on account of religion or belief continues. While persecution persists, it is undoubtedly less than it would have been without these efforts. However, we must be honest in evaluating whether these networks and meetings make a difference, not just maintaining them for the sake of their own existence. While a proponent of these efforts, meetings for the sake of meetings are the worst of internationalism. But if focused on the mission of religious freedom for all and committed to action, these networks can still serve crucial roles.

A foremost challenge is lessening political attention. The movement in 2015 rode a wave of interest as the ISIS depravities elevated religious persecution in tragically horrific ways. But memories fade. Now, wars in Europe and the Middle East distract policymakers and reduce resources. Talk of religious freedom seems a luxury while ballistic missiles rain down in the Middle East and Russian tanks advance across frontiers. An increasing focus on national interests by the United States and Europe squeezes space for a values agenda while grant money evaporates.

To shore up support, FoRB advocates can articulate how combating religious persecution compliments a hard security agenda while reflecting national values. Religious persecution is not going to fade away just because it fades on the priority list. We know persecution is intertwined with many of the most pressing challenges, directly or indirectly implicated in conflict, migration, and human rights violations. Enlightened self-interest that addresses persecution can make nations safer and more prosperous while lessening human suffering and reducing push factors of migration.

Connected is softening support among voters in democracies. Recent surveys about religious nationalism demonstrate how it is a persistent and common perspective across every region. It is understandable and natural for people to want their leaders to advance their values and look out for their communities. In my experience, most “regular people” outside of world capitals understand how religious freedom for all is the best way to secure a brighter future for their own when explained. It just needs to be explained more. Elected leaders listen to their constituents.

Next Steps

Ten years after the ICG’s launch, an expanding ecosystem of actors are focused on international religious freedom advocacy. Diplomats need not act alone; partnership is crucial. In addition to the ICG and Alliance, others include the International Panel of Parliamentarians for FoRB, the IRF Roundtables, UN NGO FoRB Committees, and various parliamentary groups like the APPGs in the UK, alongside faith-based and confessional organizations. Better coordination among these multiple nodes of activity could realize untapped potential.

Success will require coordinated, but not controlling, action. The ICG and Alliance will likely continue in their separate but adjacent lanes. While perhaps they should merge, the challenge of global persecution is significant enough to justify both, especially if they can delineate complementary (and not duplicative) areas of activity. Both can capitalize on NGO partnerships, which can help maintain, if not expand, high-level government interest. In addition, recruiting new members who fully comply with Article 18 standards will enhance credibility and momentum. We need to move more countries from rhetorical support to actual engagement with offending countries and fragile states where persecution runs rampant. By working in concert rather than in silos, the movement can maximize its reach and impact, even with diminished political and financial support.

For ideas on action, the Declaration of Principles provides a practical framework for how the FoRB ecosystem can respond to violations, outlining three key types of responses: reactive measures, proactive measures, and potential instruments of action. Reactive measures include condemning violence or incitement to violence against individuals or religious sites, whether perpetrated by state or non-state actors. The Declaration also calls for steadfastly responding to persistent violations of the right to manifest one’s religion or belief, such as the misuse of blasphemy laws, denial of legal recognition to religious or non-religious communities, and restrictions on the freedom to change one’s religion or belief. It’s the nuts-and-bolts of FoRB advocacy.

However, getting ahead of the problem is vital, and the Declaration outlines a range of proactive measures aimed at advancing freedom of religion or belief globally. These include promoting respect for diversity, tolerance, and inclusion in line with the Istanbul Process and protecting religious or belief sites from desecration. The ICG and Alliance countries can actively engage with civil society, including religious communities and leaders, while expanding literacy on freedom of religion or belief and related human rights frameworks. Upholding religious freedom alongside other fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression, is also emphasized.

Lastly, the Declaration highlights a spectrum of potential FoRB actions. Possible government responses include joint monitoring and reporting, coordinated demarches, public diplomacy efforts, interfaith engagement, victim support, and targeted sanctions. Governments and civil society can advocate together for prisoners of conscience, legal reform, rejecting religious discrimination in access to education, justice, housing, and employment, and promoting equal citizenship. Investing in civil society, training law enforcement, and supporting human rights defenders are essential steps. When employed strategically across these networks, responses can amplify impact and drive meaningful progress in protecting and advancing religious freedom globally.

Conclusion

A decade into this effort, we must continue to explore how to translate a shared value into shared action. We must expand our arguments for why religious freedom matters inside and outside the human rights agenda. In a time of persistent religious persecution, the ICG and the Alliance are an underappreciated good news story. These networks have helped set captives free and bring change to repressive systems. To protect the gains made, we must bolster these networks to weather government changes and decreased financial support. While religious freedom advocacy has never been easy, the last ten years mustn’t be the high-water mark. Too many lives are on the line.

Knox Thames served in a special envoy position during the Obama and Trump administrations focused on religious minorities in the Middle East and South/Central Asia. His book, Ending Persecution: Charting the Path to Global Religious Freedom, was released in September 2025 by University of Notre Dame Press.